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Between 1940 and 2000 there has been a substantial increase of educational
attainment in the United States. What caused this trend? Using a simple
model of schooling decisions, we assess the quantitative contribution of changes
in the return to schooling in explaining the evolution of education. We restrict
changes in the returns to schooling to match data on earnings across educational
groups and growth in aggregate labor productivity. These restrictions imply
modest increases in returns that nevertheless generate a substantial increase in
educational attainment: average years of schooling increase by 37 percent in the
model compared to 23 percent in the data. This strong quantitative eect is
robust to relevant variations of the model including allowing for changes in the
relative cost of acquiring education. We also nd that the substantial increase
in life expectancy observed during the period contributed to only 7 percent of
the change in educational attainment in the model.
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11 Introduction
One remarkable feature of the twentieth century in the United States is the
substantial increase in educational attainment of the population. Figure 1 il-
lustrates this point. In 1940, about 8 percent of white males aged 25 to 29 had
completed a college education, 31 percent had a high-school degree but did not
nish college, and 61 percent did not even complete high-school.1 The picture
is remarkably dierent in 2000 when 28 percent completed college, 62 percent
completed high-school, and 11 percent did not complete high-school. Although
our focus in this paper is on white males, Figure 1 shows that these trends are
broadly shared across genders and races. The question we address in this paper
is: What caused this substantial and systematic rise of educational attainment
in the United States? Understanding the evolution of educational attainment is
relevant given the importance of human capital on the growth experience of the
United States as well as nearly all other developed and developing countries.
There are several potential explanations for the trends in educational at-
tainment. Changes in the direct or indirect costs of schooling, changes in credit
constraints for schooling investment that operate from the relationship between
family income and education of children, changes in social norms, changes in life
expectancy which increase the eective return of schooling investment, changes
in earnings uncertainty, and changes in the returns to schooling. Although we
think that each and every one of these explanations are important and deserve
a quantitative exploration, in this paper, we focus on assessing the quantitative
eect of changes in the returns to schooling. This focus is motivated by empir-
ical evidence that has identied systematic changes in the returns to education
between 1940 and 2000 in the United States and by quantitative research show-
ing a substantial response of educational attainment to long-run changes in the
returns to schooling.2 To illustrate the changes in the returns to schooling, we
use the IPUMS samples for the 1940 to 2000 U.S. Census to compute earnings
of full-time employed white males workers of a given cohort across three educa-
tional groups: less than high-school, high-school, and college.3 Relative earnings
among educational groups exhibit noticeable changes. For instance, earnings of
college relative to high-school increased by 5 percent between 1940 and 2000
(from 1.30 in 1940 to 1.37 in 2000), while the relative earnings of high-school
to less than high-school increased by 10 percent (from 1.31 in 1940 to 1.43 in
2000).4
We develop a model of human capital accumulation that builds upon Becker
1In what follows we refer to the detailed educational categories simply as less than high-
school, high-school, and college. See the appendix for details of data sources and denitions.
2See for instance Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) for empirical evidence and Keane
and Wolpin (1997), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), and the references therein for quantitative
analysis.
3We will refer to earnings, wages, and income interchangeably.
4For a related documentation of these facts see Acemoglu (2002).Heckman, Lochner and
Todd (2003) summarize empirical estimates of changes in the returns to schooling using Mincer
regressions.
2(1964) and Ben-Porath (1967). The model features discrete schooling choices,
heterogeneity in schooling utility, a standard human capital production function
that requires the inputs of time and goods, and exogenous driving forces that
take the form of neutral and skill-biased productivity parameters in the produc-
tion function. Discrete schooling choice allows the model to better match the
distribution of people across years of schooling in the data which is strongly con-
centrated around years of degree completion. Hence, discrete schooling choice
allows the model to match distribution statistics such as those presented in
Figure 1 as opposed to just averages for a representative agent. The assump-
tion that agents are heterogeneous in the marginal utility from schooling time
is common in both the macro literature, e.g. Bils and Klenow (2000), as well
as the empirical labor literature, e.g., Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).5
Moreover, given the discreteness of schooling levels, the model with heterogene-
ity implies that changes in exogenous factors have smooth eects on aggregate
variables such as educational attainment and income.
We implement a quantitative experiment to assess the importance of changes
in relative earnings on the rise of educational attainment. We discipline the ex-
ogenous variables in the model {the pace of technical change{ by using data
on relative earnings among workers of dierent schooling groups. More gener-
ally, the parameters of the model are chosen to match a set of key statistics,
including educational attainment in 2000, earnings dierentials across schooling
levels from 1940 to 2000, and the average growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP) per worker between 1940 and 2000. This quantitative strategy follows
the approach advocated by Kydland and Prescott (1996). In particular, we em-
phasize that the parameter values are not chosen to t the data on educational
attainment from 1940 to 2000, instead they are chosen to mimic the trends in
relative earnings. The answer to the quantitative importance of changes in rel-
ative earnings over time is measured by the capacity of the model to generate
substantial trends in educational attainment as observed in the data.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. First, changes in relative earn-
ings across schooling groups generate a substantial increase in educational at-
tainment. As a summary statistic, the model generates a 37 percent increase in
average years of schooling between 1940 and 2000 compared to a corresponding
23 percent increase in the U.S. data. The bulk of this increase in the model is
generated by the change in high-school relative earnings. Second, we show that
the quantitative eects of changes in the returns to schooling are remarkably
robust to relevant variations of model specication and calibration targets. The
main quantitative results are also robust to model extensions that incorporate
alternative explanations for the increase in education such as changes in the
eective cost of acquiring education.
Our paper is closely related to Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) which
5An additional source of heterogeneity may be through \learning ability." Navarro (2007)
nds, however, that individual heterogeneity aects college attendance mostly through the
preference channel.
3focus on explaining the increase in the U.S. college wage premium in the recent
past.6 Our emphasis instead is on understanding the rise in educational at-
tainment, both at the college and high-school level, conditional on matching the
changes in the returns to schooling. This distinction is critical since we nd that
the increase in the relative high-school earnings is crucial in generating a sub-
stantial increase in educational attainment. Moreover, the exercise in Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1998) is not designed to decompose the forces that explain
the increase in educational attainment over time. Our work also contributes
to a literature in macroeconomics assessing the role of technical progress on a
variety of trends.7 Our paper is also related to the labor literature emphasiz-
ing the connection between technology and education such as Goldin and Katz
(2008) and the literature on wage inequality emphasizing skill-biased techni-
cal change.8 We recognize that changes in the returns to education may not
be the only explanation for rising education during this period. For instance
Glomm and Ravikumar (2001) emphasize the rise in public-sector provision of
education. We also recognize that educational attainment was rising well before
1940 and that changes in the returns to education may not be a contributing
factor during the earlier period. Our focus on the period between 1940 and
2000 follows from data restrictions and the emphasis in the labor literature on
rising returns to education as the likely cause of rising wage inequality. In the
broader historical context, other factors may be more important such as the
development of educational institutions and declines in schooling costs.9
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In
Section 3 we conduct the main quantitative experiments. Section 4 extends the
model to allow for changes in life expectancy, returns to experience, TFP-level
eects, and changes in costs of education not modeled in our baseline version.
In Section 5 we discuss our results by performing a series of sensitivity analysis




The economy is populated by overlapping generations of constant size normal-
ized to one. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;:::;1. Agents are alive
for T periods and are ex-ante heterogeneous. Specically, they are indexed by
a 2 R; which represents the intensity of their (dis)taste for schooling time, and
is distributed according to the time-invariant cumulative distribution function
A. We assume that the utility cost is observed before any schooling and con-
6See also Topel (1997), He (2006), and He and Liu (2008).
7See Greenwood and Seshadri (2005) and the references therein.
8See for instance Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Katz and Author (1999).
9See for instance Goldin and Katz (2008) and Kaboski (2004).
4sumption decisions are made. We also assume that there is no uncertainty.
The human capital of an individual is denoted by h(s;e) where s represents
the number of periods spent in school and e represents services aecting the
quality of education. We denote by q the relative price of education services.
Both s and e are choice variables. There are three levels of schooling labeled 1, 2
and 3. To complete level i an agent must spend si 2 fs1;s2;s3g periods in school
and, therefore, is not able to work before reaching age si + 1. The restriction
0 < s1 < s2 < s3 < T is imposed so that level 1 is the model's counterpart
to the less than high-school category discussed previously. Similarly, level 2
corresponds to the high-school category and level 3 to college. Aggregate human
capital results from the proper aggregation of individual's human capital across
generations and educational attainment. Human capital is the only input in
the production of the consumption good. The wage rate per unit of human
capital is denoted by w(s) for an agent with s years of schooling. This is to
allow for the possibility that technological progress aects the relative returns
across schooling groups. Credit markets are perfect and r denotes the gross rate
of interest.
2.2 Technology
At each date, there is one good produced with a constant-returns-to-scale tech-
nology. This technology is linear in the aggregate human capital input,
Yt = ztHt;
where zt is total factor productivity. The stock of aggregate human capital, Ht,
is also linear
Ht = z1tH1t + z2tH2t + z3tH3t; (1)
where Hit is the stock of human capital supplied by agents with schooling si,
and zit is a skill-specic productivity parameter. These linearity assumptions do
not aect the main quantitative results of the paper but simplify the exposition
and computation of the model. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of
the model with dierent assumptions on the elasticities of substitution across
schooling groups.
The technical parameters zt and zit are the only exogenous variables in the
economy. Since our focus is on long-run trends, we assume constant growth
rates:
zt+1 = gzt
zi;t+1 = gizit; for i = 1;2;3:
Equation (1) implies that the following normalization is innocuous: z1t = 1 for
all t, thus g1 = 1. Regarding the level of zt, we set it to one at an arbitrary
date. As it will transpire shortly, this normalization is innocuous too. The
determination of the levels of z2t and z3t is discussed in Section 3.
5We consider a market arrangement where there is a large number of competi-
tive rms in both product and factor markets that have access to the production
technology. Taking the output good as the num eraire, the wage rate per unit of
human capital is given by
wt(si) = ztzi:
The youngest worker of type i at date t is of age si+1 and thus, was \born"
in period t   si, i.e. of age 1 at date t   si. The oldest worker is T-period old





where pi is the fraction of cohort  that has attained the ith level of education,
and e(si) is the optimal schooling quality of this cohort. The discussions of
e(si) and pi are postponed to Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3 Households
Preferences are dened over consumption sequences and time spent in school.
They are represented by the following utility function, for an agent of cohort :
+T 1 X
t=
t  ln(c;t)   as;
where  2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, c;t is the period-t consumption
of an agent of generation  and, nally, s 2 fs1;s2;s3g represents years of
schooling. Note that a can be positive or negative so that schooling provides
either a utility benet or a cost. The distribution of a is normal with mean 







where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution. While the shape of this distribution is important for assessing the
quantitative role of changes in relative earnings on educational attainment, the
normal distribution ts our calibration targets very well. In addition, in Section
5 we show that, in order to t the same data, the calibration of a more general
distribution function essentially renders back a normal distribution. As a result,
a more general 2-parameter distribution yields the same quantitative results in
terms of the elasticity of educational attainment to relative earnings.
The optimization problem of a cohort- individual with cost of schooling a,
conditional on going to school for s periods, is


























where  2 (0;1): The maximization is with respect to sequences of consumption
and the quality of education e. The budget constraint equates the date-
value of consumption to the date- value of labor earnings, h(s;e)W(s), net
of investment in quality, qe. The function W(s) indicates the date- value
of labor earnings per unit of human capital. This program summarizes the
various costs associated with acquiring education: the utility cost a, the time
cost embodied in the denition of W(s), and the resource cost qe.




This problem can be solved in steps. First, given s, the individual chooses
e to maximizes net lifetime earnings. Then, given net lifetime earnings, the
individual allocates consumption through time using the credit markets. Finally,
the individual chooses s. Hence, conditional on s, the optimal investment in





e(s) = s[q 1W(s)(1   )]1=:
The optimal amount of human capital is
h(s;e(s)) = s[q 1W(s)(1   )](1 )=: (3)
For later reference, we dene the period t labor income of an agent of cohort 
with education si as
Li;;t = h(si;e(si))wt(si);
for t   + si: The net lifetime income of an agent of cohort  is I(s) =
h(s;e(s))W(s)   qe(s) or
I(s) = sW(s)1=q1 1=; (4)
where  = (1   )(1 )=   (1   )1=. The optimal allocation of consumption
over time, given I(s), is dictated by the Euler equation, c;t+1 = rc;t, and
the lifetime budget constraint. It is convenient to dene V(s)  ~ V(a;s) + as.
7The function V(s) is the lifetime utility derived from consumption only, for an
agent of cohort  with s periods of schooling, and is not a function of a. The
optimal schooling choice described in (2) can then be written as
max
s2fs1;s2;s3g
fV(s)   asg: (5)
2.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices fwt(si)g and an allocation of households
across schooling levels such that, for all t, wt(si) = ztzit and households of any
cohort  solve problem (2) given prices.
In equilibrium each cohort is partitioned between the three levels of school-
ing. The determination of this partition is described in Figures 2 and 3. Figure
2 describes an individual's optimal schooling choice by comparing the value
functions V(s)   as across the three levels s1, s2 and s3: Each pair of value
functions has one intersection.10 An individual of type a chooses the schooling
level which delivers the highest value. Specically, consider an individual choos-
ing between si and sj, with i > j and i;j 2 f1;2;3g. The individual chooses si
over sj whenever the individual's utility cost of schooling is low enough, that is
whenever a < aij; where aij; is a threshold utility cost for which an individual
with such utility cost of schooling is indierent between level i and j:11
V(si)   aij;si = V(sj)   aij;sj:
The educational attainment rates of cohort , denoted by pi, are then
p1 = 1   A(a21;); (6)
p2 = A(a21;)   A(a32;); (7)
p3 = A(a32;); (8)
as illustrated in Figure 3.12
It is possible to characterize the threshold utility costs as functions of the













10The implication that there exist one intersection between each pair of value functions is
a result of the innite support for a and the fact that s3 > s2 > s1.
11Since individuals are indexed by their utility cost of schooling we also refer to the threshold
aij as the critical agent.
12The innite support for a ensures that there is always a non-empty set of individuals
choosing the rst level of schooling and another non-empty set of individuals choosing the third
level. It is possible, however, that no individual nds it optimal to choose the second level. In
such case, there is only one critical agent, a31;, dened by V(s3) a31;s3 = V(s1) a31;s1:
We do not emphasize this case since it does not arise in our main quantitative work.






















Equations (9) and (10) indicate the forces that determine the level of educational
attainment at a point in time and its evolution over time. We emphasize the
following properties of the determination of educational attainment.
Remark 1 Equation (9) establishes that the threshold utility costs are pro-
portional to the semi-elasticity of net lifetime income across educational attain-
ment levels. For instance, an increase in the lifetime income of college relative
to high-school raises the threshold utility cost for entering college and, given
a distribution of people across schooling-utility costs, more individuals choose
to attend college. The change in college attainment depends on the magnitude
of the change in the threshold as well as the shape of the distribution A of
schooling-utility cost.
Remark 2 Equation (10) establishes that changes in relative lifetime income
are driven only by the change in the ratio zi=zj. Combining (6) and (7)
with (9) and (10), we obtain expressions for the change in the distribution of


























When there is no skill biased technical progress (i.e., g1 = g2 = g3), the ra-
tio of lifetime incomes are constant across education groups and, therefore, as
indicated by the above expressions, there are no changes in educational attain-
ment across generations. When g1 < g2 < g3, there are changes in the returns
to schooling and therefore educational attainment changes: more individuals
choose to attend college and less choose less than high-school. The pace of
these changes is not constant, and the magnitude of change depends critically
on the distribution A of schooling-utility cost.
Remark 3 Constant growth in total factor productivity zt generates growth
in output per capita but no changes in educational attainment. Individuals
9accumulate more human capital as the economy grows, however, by purchasing
more educational services e, a fact that transpires from Equation (3). In Section
4.3, we consider an extension of the model to allow for TFP-level eects and
show that our main results still hold under this more general specication.
Remark 4 The relative price of education q does not aect educational at-
tainment because it is assumed constant across education groups. In Section
4.4 we discuss the quantitative implications of allowing for time-varying and
skill-dependent prices for educational services.
Remark 5 The threshold schooling-utility costs in equation (9) are not di-
rectly aected by the distribution A of schooling-utility costs in the popula-
tion. This property has two important implications. First, the distribution
A of schooling-utility costs can be disciplined by data on the distribution of
educational attainment at a point in time and we use this implication in our
calibration strategy. Second, changes in the returns to education have a direct
impact on the schooling-cost thresholds but their eect on educational attain-
ment hinges critically on the shape of the distribution A. This will explain why
our main quantitative results are so robust to relevant variations in the model
and to modeling alternative economic forces.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we discuss the calibration and main quantitative results. The
calibration strategy consists of two stages. First, some parameters are assigned
numerical values using a-priori information. Second, the remaining parameters
are calibrated to match key statistics of the U.S. economy for the year 2000, as
well as overall growth in GDP per worker and relative earnings across schooling
groups during the period 1940 to 2000. Unlike the business cycle literature,
where the evolution of productivity is calibrated independently to Solow resid-
uals, we do not have independent measures of the main driving forces. These
measures are derived by having the model match the changes in relative earn-
ings. We then assess the quantitative contribution of changes in returns to
education in explaining the rise in educational attainment in the U.S. economy.
3.1 Calibration
The rst stage of our calibration strategy is to assign values to some parameters
using a-priori information. We let a period represent one year and consider that
agents are born at age 6. Thus, the generation reaching age 25 in 2000 makes
decision in 1981. The length of model life is set to T = 67, which corresponds to
the life expectancy at age 5, for white males in 1981. We set the gross interest
rate to r = 1:04, and the subjective discount factor to  = 1=r:
10The number of years spent in school for the average member of each of our
three groups has not been constant between 1940 and 2000. Using the IPUMS
samples for the 1940 and 2000 U.S. Census, we nd that the average number of
years spent in school, by an individual of the rst group, was 8.5 in 1940 and 9.4
in 2000. For and individual of the second group, we nd an increase from 12.5
to 13, between 1940 and 2000. We allow years of schooling to vary in line with
these ndings. Namely, we set s1;1921 = 8:5 and s1;1981 = 9:4, and allow for a
constant rate of growth between the two dates. Similarly, we set s2;1921 = 12:5
and s2;1981 = 13. We set s3 = 16 for all years.
The list of remaining parameters is
 = (;;;q;g;gz2;gz3;z2;2000;z3;2000)
which consists of the distribution parameters for the utility cost of schooling, the
human capital technology, the relative price of education services and growth
rates and levels for productivity variables. We build a measure of the distance
between statistics in the model and the corresponding statistics in the U.S. data.
The procedure targets the following statistics: (i) the educational attainment of
the 25-29 years old in the 2000 Census which are 10.9 percent less than high-
school and 61.5 percent high-school;13 (ii) a share of time in the total cost of
education in 2000 of 90 percent { see for instance Bils and Klenow (2000); (iii)
the ratio of the cost of education to output in 2000 which is 7.2 percent { see
Snyder, Dillow, and Homan (2009); (iv) the time path of relative earnings
from 1940 to 2000; and (v) the growth rate of GDP per worker from 1940
to 2000 which was on average 2 percent. We then choose each element of 
simultaneously to minimize this function.
Even though parameter values are chosen simultaneously to match the data
targets in (i) to (v), each parameter has a rst-order eect on some target. For
instance, the levels of skill-biased technology, zi;2000, and their growth rates, gi,
are important in matching the time path of relative earnings across schooling
groups. The growth of Total Factor Productivity, g, is important in matching
growth in average labor productivity. The time share  is important for the
share of time in human capital accumulation.14 The utility cost of schooling
parameters,  and , are crucial in matching the distribution of educational at-
tainment in 2000. Finally, the relative price of education services, q, determines
the cost-of-education to output ratio.
The calibration procedure can be described formally as follows. Given a






13The model counterpart to these statistics is educational attainment of the 1981 generation
which is 20 years old in 2000 in the model and corresponds to age 25 in the U.S. data.
14It turns out that because the model abstracts from TFP-level eects, the shares of time
and goods in the production of human capital are irrelevant for the quantitative properties of
the baseline model. They do aect the earnings of a given schooling group across cohorts.
11is the ratio of earnings between members of group i and j, between the age
of 25 and 29 (that is 25-29 in the data) at date t: The empirical counterpart
of ^ E32;t() is the relative earnings between college and high-school, for white
males between the age of 25 and 29, denoted by E32;t. Similarly, ^ E21;t() is
the model counterpart of E21;t, the relative earnings of high-school to less than


















where xt is the average share of time in the total cost of education and
P
i pi;00e00(si)=si
is a measure of the annual cost of education.15 Then, to assign a value to  we










^ E21;t()=E21;t   1
2
+ M()>M()
where T  f1940;1950;:::;2000g:
The second column of Table 1 indicates the value of the calibrated param-
eters. The model is able to match exactly the calibration targets in terms of
the moments summarized in M(). Also, the model implies a smooth path of
relative earnings that captures the trend observed in the data as illustrated in
Figure 4.16
3.2 Baseline Experiment
The main quantitative implications of the model are the time paths for the
distribution of educational attainment for the three categories considered: less
than high-school, high-school, and college. Figure 5 reports these implications of
the model. The model implies a substantial increase in educational attainment.
The fraction of 25 to 29 year-olds with college education increases in the model
by 25 percentage points from 1940 to 2000, while in the data the increase is 20
percentage points. For high-school, the model implies an increase from 11 to
61.5 percent between 1940 and 2000 whereas, in the data, the increase is from
31 to 61.5 percent.





i=1;2;3 pi;t(Li;t;tsi + qet(si))
:
16Our specication of skill bias has only two parameters per relative skill level, as a result,
the best the calibration can do is to t a trend line through the data points. As we will
discuss below, skill bias produces a substantial eect on educational attainment so the exact
parametrization matters for the quantitative results. In Section 3.3 we discuss the results in
light of dierent assumptions regarding skill-biased technology.
12To summarize the quantitative ndings of the model, we calculate average
years of schooling of a given generation as the years of schooling required in
2000 in each educational category, multiplied by the distribution of educational
attainment of the generation. We calculate average years of schooling for the




where p is the distribution of educational attainment. We refer to this statistic as
average years of schooling. In the U.S. data average years of schooling increased
by 23 percent, from 10.8 in 1940 to 13.3 in 2000. The model reproduces the
average years of schooling in 2000 as it is a calibration target. The model implies
an average years of schooling in 1940 of 9.7. Thus, by this measure, average
years of schooling increase by a factor 1.37 in the model versus 1.23 in the U.S.
data.
We chose the year 2000 for most of our calibration targets. Given how
dierent the educational attainments are in 1940, the question arises whether
the results depend on this choice. We investigate this issue by calibrating the
economy to data for 1940 instead. The calibrated parameters are presented in
the last column of Table 1. Note that the parameters are reasonably close in
each calibration, except for  and , which should not be a surprise. Given this
alternative calibration, the quantitative results are fairly similar, for instance,
the increase in average years of schooling from 1940 to 2000 is 38 percent, close
to the 37 percent increase in the baseline model calibrated to data in 2000.
3.3 Decomposing the Forces
The motivation for our approach is to exploit the observed earnings heterogene-
ity in a parsimonious environment to isolate its contribution on the evolution
of educational attainment. In light of this, we decompose the importance of the
exogenous forces leading to labor productivity and earnings growth by running
a sequence of counterfactual experiments. These experiments are reported in
Table 2.
The rst experiment is designed to assess the importance of the high-school
bias in earnings. That is, we seek an answer to the question: what would
educational attainment look like if the earnings of a member of group 2 grew
at the same rate as those of a member of group 1, while the premium for a
member of group 3 still behave as in the baseline case? In our model there
are two sources of school-specic earnings bias: skill-biased technical change
and within-group length of schooling. Denote by ~ gzi the growth rate of skill-
biased technical change in the counterfactual experiment. Likewise, let ~ gsi be
the growth rate of the length of schooling. To \shut down" the high-school
bias in earnings we set: ~ gz2 = ~ gz1 = 1; ~ gz3=~ gz2 = gz3=gz2; ~ gs2 = ~ gs1 = gs1;
and ~ gs3=~ gs2 = gs3=gs2. Measured by average years of schooling, the change in
13educational attainment falls to 2 percent from 37 percent in the baseline. Lower
educational attainment growth leads to substantially lower labor productivity
growth (1.7 vs 2 percent in the baseline).
The second experiment assesses the role of the college bias. We choose the
growth rate of exogenous forces such that: ~ gz2 = gz2; ~ gz3 = gz2; ~ gs2 = gs2; and
~ gs3 = gs2. In this case the earnings of college relative to high-school does not
change over time. The departure in this experiment, in terms of average educa-
tional attainment, is much less than in the previous experiment: average years
of schooling increase by 27 percent instead of 37 percent in the baseline. Also,
we note that the college bias does not contribute much to overall productivity
growth since it grows at slightly less than 2 percent. In a third experiment, we
shut down skill bias all together by imposing gzi = gsi = 1 for all levels. As
discussed previously, the model without skill-biased technical change does not
generate any change in educational attainment and relative earnings. As a con-
sequence, labor productivity growth is slightly above the value of g. Given the
results from these experiments, we conclude that, in terms of skill-biased techni-
cal change, the high-school bias is the most important force behind the changes
in educational attainment. More precisely, shutting down the high-school bias
implies the largest departure from the baseline at the aggregate level (average
years of schooling and the growth rate of the economy).
We emphasize that the educational attainment implications of the model
are sensitive to the calibration of skill-biased technical change. The baseline
calibration captures the overall trend in relative earnings over the 1940 to 2000
period. However, this trend is calculated only over 7 Census years and there
is substantial decade-to-decade variation in relative earnings. We illustrate the
quantitative importance of the trends in relative earnings by conducting a fourth
experiment were we reduce by one half the growth rate of relative earnings
between 1940 and 2000. We set ~ gzi = 1 + (gzi   1)=2 for i = 2;3 and ~ gsi = 1 +
(gsi  1)=2 for i = 1;2;3. In this experiment, average years of schooling between
1940 to 2000 increase by 19 percent (versus 37 percent in the baseline), while
average growth in GDP per worker is 1.86 percent (2 percent in the baseline).
4 Extensions
In this section we consider four extensions of the model mechanisms that can
potentially aect the importance of relative earnings on educational attainment.
First, we study a simulation of the model that allows for life expectancy to
change according to data. Since there has been a substantial change in life
expectancy for the relevant cohorts in the sample period we ask whether this
can provide an important source of changes in educational attainment. Second,
we incorporate on-the-job human capital accumulation into the model. Human
capital accumulated on the job aects lifetime income and therefore can aect
educational attainment. Third, in the spirit of Ben-Porath (1967), Manuelli and
Seshadri (2006) and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2009), we extend the
14model to allow for TFP-level changes to aect schooling decisions. Finally, we
allow for changes in the cost of education over time. In all these extensions, we
nd that the main conclusion that changes in the returns to education imply a
substantial increase in educational attainment remains unaltered.
4.1 Life Expectancy
There has been a substantial increase in life-expectancy in the United States.
For males, life expectancy at age 5 increased from around 50 years in 1850 to
around 70 years in 2000. Because the return to schooling investment accrues
with the working life, this increase can generate an incentive for higher amounts
of schooling investment. However, human capital theory also indicates that the
returns to human capital investment are higher early in the life cycle rather
than later {see for instance Ben-Porath (1967){ and as a result, increases in
life expectancy may command a low return given that they extend the latest
part of the life cycle of individuals. Whereas the increase in life expectancy is
substantial, this life-cycle aspect of the increase in life expectancy may dampen
the overall contribution of this factor in promoting human capital investment.
In this section we ask whether the increase in life expectancy is quantitatively
important in explaining the increase in educational attainment and whether it
dampens the contribution of relative earnings in our baseline model.
We proceed by simulating the model using the changes in life expectancy as
observed in the data.17 We recalibrate the economy in 2000 to the same targets
but taking into account the changes in life expectancy. The main changes in the
calibration relative to the baseline involve parameters pertaining to the distri-
bution of utility cost of schooling and the growth rates of technology. Overall,
we nd that the increase in life-expectancy does not change the implications
of the model substantially, in fact, life-expectancy has only modest eects in
educational attainment during this period. We make this assessment by com-
paring the implications on educational attainment of the model calibrated to the
changes in life expectancy with the model keeping life expectancy constant at
its 2000 level. The model with changes in life expectancy generates an increase
of 42 percent in average years of schooling. Holding life expectancy constant
reduces this increase to 39 percent, close to the baseline model. Hence, the
change in life expectancy during this period explains 7 percent of the increase
in educational attainment (3 percentage points out of 42). We conclude that
while changes in life expectancy are substantial during this period, their ef-
fect on educational attainment are not quantitatively important. Moreover, the
change in life expectancy does not aect the quantitative importance of returns
to schooling.
17Specically, the life expectancy of the period-t generation is Tt = gTTt 1 given an initial
condition T1850. The pair (T1850;gT) is chosen as to minimize the distance between the U.S.
data and [Tt], in a least square sense. (The notation [] denotes the nearest integer function.)
154.2 On-the-job Human Capital Accumulation
The baseline model abstracts from human capital accumulated on the job. The
data suggest that there are considerable returns to experience. The age prole
of earnings, for example, are increasing in the data while our baseline model
implies that they are decreasing. Returns to experience may aect educational
decisions. First, if they increase with education { as we will show it is the case in
the data { then this provides an additional return to schooling, reinforcing the
eects of skill-biased technical change. Second, substantial returns to experience
implies that, other things equal, individuals would have an incentive to enter
the labor market sooner. Because of these opposing eects, it is a quantitative
question whether on-the-job human capital accumulation aects the evolution
of educational attainment over time.




where x = a   s measures years of experience and 
(s) is the human capital
elasticity of experience for a worker who has completed s years of schooling.
Note that we allow this elasticity to dier across schooling groups. This feature
is motivated by the age prole of earnings observed in the year 2000. Namely,
the ratios of earnings between a 55- and a 25-year old are 1.6, 1.9, and 2.1 for
less than high-school, high-school, and college.
In our rst pass at assessing the importance of returns to experience, we
choose the three 
(si)'s to match the age prole of earnings in 2000.18 In terms
of educational attainment, the calibrated model with on-the-job human capital
accumulation reduces the incentives to remain in school created by skill-biased
technical progress. The average number of years of schooling increases from
10.4 in 1940 to 13.3 in 2000 { an increase of 27 percent which compares to 23
percent in the U.S. data and 37 percent in the baseline model. The calibrated
returns to experience in this extension of the model dampen the incentives for
schooling investment.
We note, however, that there is strong evidence that the returns to experi-
ence have been falling for recent cohorts in the U.S. data { see Manovskii and
Kambourov (2005). To try and capture the eect of this decrease in returns to
experience, we compare the life-prole of earnings of a 25 year old in 1940 versus
a 25 year old in 1970 { see Table 3. A 25-year-old in 1940 can expect annual
earnings to increase by a factor of at least 3.19 when reaching 55 years of age.
In sharp contrast, a 25-year-old in 1970 should not expect earnings to increase
by a factor of more than 2.25 when reaching 55. This \
attening" of the age
prole of earnings does not aect equally all educational groups. In fact, the
18We recalibrate the model as described in Section 3.1, with three additional targets: the
ratios of earnings between a 55- and a 25-year old in 2000 in each group. The calibrated
parameters g, g2, and g3 are 1:014, 1:003, and 1:005: We nd 
(s1) = 0:38, 
(s2) = 0:44 and

(s3) = 0:33 for the human capital elasticity of experience. The model matches the age prole
of earnings in 2000 by construction.
16increase in earnings throughout the life cycle is enhanced more by education for
the 1970 cohort than for the 1940 cohort: A 25-year old in 1940 would see earn-
ings increase 6 percent faster choosing high-school versus less than high-school.
In 1970, the same individual would see earnings increase 30 percent faster by
choosing high-school. The same result holds, qualitatively, for college versus
high-school: for the 1940 generation, moving from high-school to college entails
a 13 percent increase in earnings. In 1970 this move would entail a 52 percent
increase.
We conclude that the 
attening of the life proles of earnings across genera-
tions is conducive to attracting recent generations into more schooling. We use
the model to compute educational attainment for the 1940 and 1970 cohorts.
Adjusting the 
(si)'s to allow for the 
attening of the life proles of earnings, we
nd that the implied increase in educational attainment is slightly above that of
the baseline experiment that abstracts from returns to experience (37 percent).
Hence, changes in relative earnings generate a substantial increase in educa-
tional attainment and this eect is robust to the incorporation of reasonable
returns to experience in the data.
4.3 TFP-Level Eects
The baseline model abstracts from TFP-level eects. Since there is a litera-
ture that emphasizes TFP-level eects in explaining schooling dierences across
countries, we extend the model to allow for these eects. We follow Ben-Porath
(1967) in allowing for TFP-level eects by extending our production function
for human capital to include stages in human capital accumulation, where the
human capital from previous schooling levels enters as an input in the produc-





where i 2 f1;2;3g denotes the schooling stage and h0 = 1. The lifetime net
income of an agent of generation  is then
I(si) = max
e1;e2;e30
fhiW(si)   qe1   qe2   qe3g:
In this formulation, the eciency units of labor of an agent are used either for
producing goods in the market or for producing next stage human capital in
school. This diers from the previous formulation where eciency units of labor
where used only in producing goods. The agent decides how much to spend at
each level of schooling ei. An implication of this extension is that a unit of
spending in high-school quality increases the marginal productivity of spending
in college. Thus, when the level of income rises because of TFP, a one percent
increase in education quality aects income proportionately more at the highest
level of education. Formally, we can show that dlnI(si)=dlnz =  i while in
the baseline model this elasticity is 1= at each schooling level i:
17We calibrate this version of the model exactly as described in Section 3.1.
We nd that the increase in average years of schooling in the model is 41 percent,
slightly above the baseline model that abstracts from TFP-level eects where it
is 37 percent. We then use this calibrated version of the model to compute the
evolution of educational attainment predicted when skill-biased technical change
is set to zero, that is when gzi = gsi = 1:0 for i = 1;2;3. Thus, TFP alone drives
the results of this experiment. We nd that average years of schooling increase
by 13 percent and conclude that 31 percent (13=41) of the rise in average years
of schooling is due to the increase in the TFP level.
4.4 The Cost of Education
In our baseline model the relative price of education services q is the same across
education groups and constant over time. We assess how these assumptions may
aect our results by considering two broad alternative specications for the costs
of education.
4.4.1 Schooling-Specic Technical Progress
We consider an extension of our baseline model where the relative price of
education is dierent across schooling groups and is growing at dierent rates.
Hence, the relative price of education is indexed by time  and schooling level
si: qi. Under this assumption, the optimal choice of the level of education




We note that the solution to this program is the same for the case where the hu-
man capital production function features investment-specic technical progress









i e1  where zh
i  1=qi. Thus, in this extension of the model, changes
in the relative price of education services are related to skill-biased technical
progress.
As noted earlier, a critical determinant for the evolution of educational at-
tainment in the model is the behavior of relative lifetime income, net of edu-













Observe that the relative price of schooling aects the returns to schooling.
Thus, unlike in the preceding exercises, we cannot determine the eect of the
returns to education independently of changes in the cost of education. We
assume that the relative price of education changes at a constant rate gqi so
18that the price of education is characterized by a level and growth parameter:
qi = qi0  g
qi:
We can establish the following results. First, when relative prices grow at the
same rate across schooling groups, that is when gq1 = gq2 = gq3; it is possible
to just adjust the levels of zi's to match the same levels of relative earnings
in the calibration. These adjustments would leave relative net lifetime income
unchanged. As a result, in this case educational attainment would evolve exactly
as in the baseline economy. Second, when relative prices grow at dierent rates,
gq1 6= gq2 6= gq3, in order to calibrate the model to the same targets for relative
earnings in the data, an adjustment to the levels and growth rates of the zi's is
necessary. In this case, relative net lifetime income will change. How does this
aect our evaluation of the elasticity of educational attainment to changes in
the returns to schooling? We assume that q1 = q2 and as a result we have only
four more parameters in the model: q20, q30, gq2 and gq3. To discipline the level
parameters, q20 and q30, we use the ratio of the cost of education to output,
as in our baseline calibration and the ratio of higher education expenditures
to elementary and secondary expenditures that in 2000 was 0.60 for the U.S.
economy. To restrict the growth parameters, we calculate using the Higher
Education Price Index from Snyder, Dillow, and Homan (2009), that the cost
of higher education has risen at a rate 1 percentage point above that of the
GDP implicit price de
ator. Hence, we set gq3 = 1:01.19 There is no price index
for elementary and secondary education. Thus, we report the implications of
two alternative values for gq2. In the rst case, we set gq2 = 1:02 and nd
that the model predicts an increase in average years of schooling of 34 percent.
In the second case, we set gq2 = 0:98 and nd an increase in average years of
schooling of 44 percent. We consider the second experiment more in line with
the evidence since it implies that the cost of education to GDP in 1940 is 2.5
percent (3 percent in the U.S. data in 1949) whereas the alternative assumption
implies a cost of education to GDP in 1940 of 25.5 percent.
We conclude that incorporating changes in the relative price of education, in
line with empirical evidence, does not alter our main conclusion that observed
changes in the returns to schooling generate large changes in educational attain-
ment. Furthermore, our nding suggests that reasonably calibrated changes in
the relative price of education strengthen the elasticity of educational attain-
ment to returns to schooling.
4.4.2 Fixed Costs
In the preceding formulation, we have assumed that individuals choose the mag-
nitude of all pecuniary costs associated with attaining an educational level. We
consider an alternative formulation where some pecuniary costs of education
might be beyond the control of individuals.
19See Snyder, Dillow, and Homan (2009), Tables 25 and 31. The Higher Education Price
Index was computed only from 1960.
19We start from our baseline model and assume that, in addition to education
services purchased at price q, individuals must also pay a xed cost in order to
complete an educational level. Thus, the income maximization problem writes
e(si) = argmax
e fh(si;e)W(s)   qe   kig:
We model xed costs that vary across skill groups and over time as
ki = ki0  g
ki
so that we have a level and growth parameter for each educational level. We
assume k1 = k2. We choose the levels k20 and k30 to match the cost of
education to output ratio, and the the ratio of higher education expenditures
to elementary and secondary expenditures. Since we interpret these xed costs
broadly, we do not have direct observations of them. Our objective is to evaluate
their potential importance in biasing the quantitative assessment of the role of
changes in returns to education. Therefore, we choose to discipline the growth
parameters gk2 and gk3 such that our model is as close as possible to replicating
the growth in observed educational attainment. This implies gk2 = 1:028 and
gk3 = 1:03. A possible interpretation of these changes in schooling costs is that
there are factors that have made education eectively more costly, specially for
college. This interpretation is consistent with both the indirect evidence of a
stronger relationship between family income and educational attainment over
time in Belley and Lochner (2007) as well as the direct evidence suggesting an
increase in tuition costs and an overall erosion of borrowing limits as summarized
by Kane (2007). The model implies that average years of schooling increase by
24 percent (versus 23 percent in the U.S. data.) Figure 6 displays the model's
predicted path for educational attainment with the U.S. data.20
We can now ask how these costs aect our evaluation of the eect of the
returns to schooling on educational attainment. We do this by computing the
path implied for educational attainment under the counterfactual assumption
that the xed costs of education remain constant (i.e., gk1 = gk2 = gk3 = 1:0).
Thus, this exercise measures the eect of changes in relative earnings alone.
We nd that average years of schooling increase by 40 percent. Recall that the
baseline model implied an increase in average years of schooling of 37 percent.
We conclude that, although some explicit or implicit costs to education may
be important for matching the evolution of educational attainment in the data,
their abstraction does not alter our measure of the elasticity of educational
attainment to changes in the returns to schooling. Assessing the specic forces
such as borrowing constraints, earnings uncertainty, and direct costs among
others, that have lead to an increase in the eective cost of education is an
interesting question that we leave for future research.
20The calibrated parameters are  = 0:62,  = 0:69,  = 0:93, gz = 1:01, gz2 = 1:003 and
gz3 = 1:005:
205 Discussion
In this section we evaluate the robustness of our main quantitative results to
relevant variations in functional-form specications. Namely, we introduce im-
perfect substitution across schooling groups in the output technology and we
consider alternative distributions for the marginal utility of schooling. We nd
that the importance of changes in relative earnings in explaining the increase in
educational attainment is remarkably robust to these variations.
5.1 Substitution across Schooling Groups
We emphasize that the technology for aggregate human capital allows perfect
substitution between skill groups. This assumption is less problematic than it
may rst appear. The reason is that our results do not emphasize a particular
quantitative elasticity of educational attainment to skill-biased technical change.
Neither do they emphasize a tight measurement of skill-biased technical param-
eters. Clearly those applications would necessitate tight measurements for the
elasticities in the technology for aggregate human capital as well as other sources
of labor productivity growth. Instead our emphasis is on the role of changes in
the returns to schooling { as measured by changes in relative earnings { on ed-
ucational attainment. Our results do not hinge on what the sources of changes
in returns to education are. Alternative technology specications, for example,
would require dierent measurements of the zi's to match the same relative
earnings paths. The discipline imposed on the quantitative results of the paper
hinges on the relative earnings paths observed in the U.S. data.
The following exercise illustrates this point. Consider, a general constant-






where  < 1. Output is Yt = ztHt. This specication implies an elasticity of
substitution of 1=(1 ) between skill groups. For values of  strictly below one
dierent skill groups are more complementary than in the baseline specication,
and an increase in any given zit aects the wage rate of all skill groups. The
assumption that the elasticity of substitution is the same between any pair of
skill groups may seem restrictive. Goldin and Katz (2008), for example, use
dierent elasticity of substitution between pairs of skill groups. But again, once
the model is restricted to match the relative earnings observed in the U.S. data,
dierences in technologies only imply dierent measurements for the zi's, but
do not aect educational attainment.
For simplicity, we consider a steady-state situation in levels, that is a situ-
ation where zt and the zit's are constant through time.21 An equilibrium is a
set of prices, w(si), and an allocation of individuals across schooling levels such
21Our model does not have a balanced growth path.
21that:







Hi = (T   si)h(si;e(si));
for i 2 f1;2;3g, and individuals solve problem (2) given prices. The rst con-
dition above equates the marginal product of human capital for skill group i to
its wage rate. The second equation is the labor market clearing condition for
skill group i.
The nature of the exercise is similar to that of Section 3.1. We proceed in
two steps. First, we calibrate the steady state of the model to match the U.S.
economy in 2000. We set the si to their corresponding values and r,  and T
to their values in Table 1. We set z1 and z to one. We have two targets for
educational attainment rates, two for relative earnings and one for the share
of time in the total cost of education. We pick ve parameters to match these
targets: (;;;z2;z3). In a second step, we set the si's to their values for the
1940 generation and we re-calibrate z, z2 and z3. We choose them to match
three targets: the relative earnings in 1940 and the ratio of GDP per capita
between 1940 and 2000. Hence, as in the baseline calibration, this exercise
uses the evolution of relative earnings to measure skill-specic technical change.
We then ask by how much educational attainment is changing. We repeat this
exercise for dierent values of . This procedure delivers the equivalent of the
baseline experiment described earlier.
Table 4 reports the results. For selected values for , the table shows edu-
cational attainment in 1940, as well as the calibrated values of key parameters.
By comparing across steady-state economies with dierent values for , Table
4 shows that the elasticity of substitution does not aect the main conclusions.
Once skill-biased technical parameters are calibrated to match the evolution of
relative earnings, changes in educational attainment across dierent calibrations
for  are identical. In addition, it is interesting to note that the calibrated pa-
rameters for the human capital technology and the distribution of utility cost of
schooling are hardly changing across these calibrations. Thus, the main eect of
 is to impose dierent values for the skill-biased technical parameters in levels
and rates of change.
We recognize that these results only apply to a steady-state version of the
model. However, we expect that the same quantitative eects will carry through
in the dynamic version of the model with dierent elasticities of substitution
across skill groups. Data limitations prevent us from carrying through these
experiments. When  < 1, the dynamic version of the model requires much
more data than presently available. The reason for this is that in the model with
 < 1, the wage rate at a point in time depends on the educational attainment
of all cohorts working. Thus, this will require data on relative earnings going as
far back as 1900 or before. And wages are necessary to solve for human capital
and earnings in 1940. When  = 1, wages are only a function of technical
parameters at each date. Assuming perfect substitution across skill groups in
22the human capital technology not only allows us to assess the role of technical
change in educational attainment in a simple and tractable framework, but also
gives us a reasonable characterization since the quantitative implications of the
model turn out to be insensitive to alternative substitution elasticities after the
model is calibrated to match the same relative earnings targets.
5.2 Distribution of Marginal Utility of Schooling
The model assumes a Normal distribution to represent heterogeneity in pref-
erences. Are the results robust to this choice? Alternative distributional as-
sumptions may deliver dierent implications for the evolution of educational
attainment. In fact, changes in educational attainment depend on the distri-
bution of the marginal cost of schooling time, as can be seen from Equations
(6) to (8). To address this issue, we consider a more general distribution func-
tion: the Beta distribution. This distribution is dened on the unit interval and
characterized by two parameters. Depending on the parameters, its density can
be uniform, bell-shaped or u-shaped and it is not necessarily symmetric. Our
question is whether the calibration described in Section 3.1 imposes enough dis-
cipline on the distribution of schooling utility so as to identify the elasticity of
educational attainment to relative earnings.
We use the Beta distribution because it has two parameters and, therefore,
we can keep our calibration strategy while allowing the distribution of schooling
utility to be potentially dierent from a Normal. To make comparisons with
the baseline case, where the marginal utility of schooling can take any value on










where b is distributed according to a Beta distribution and M is a positive
number. Hence, the marginal utility of schooling time is (Mb   M=2). The
role of M is to map the domain of b into the interval [ M=2;M=2], therefore
allowing an arbitrarily large range for the marginal utility of schooling time.
We calibrate this version of the model as described in Section 3.1, for dierent
values of M.22 Thus, the distribution of a is subject to the same discipline
as in our baseline exercise. We describe our ndings in two steps. First, we
nd that for large enough values of M the mean and variance of the marginal
utility of schooling are the same (up to the fth digit) than in our baseline
calibration. When we increase M, these number gets even closer. Second,
22Remark 5 of Section 2 plays a role here. Since the thresholds utility costs do not depend on
the distribution, the same thresholds must hold under the current (Beta) model than under
the baseline (Normal) model, for the 1981 generation. Hence, the parameters of the Beta
distribution can be found by solving a system of two equations in two unknowns: given the
thresholds, what is the Beta distribution which delivers the actual distribution of educational
attainment for the 1981 generation?
23we compute the sum of squared dierences between the path of educational
attainment obtained from the baseline (Normal) model and from the current
(Beta) model. We nd that the dierence can be arbitrary small. For example,
if M = 500, the dierence is of the order of 2:5  1:0e 9.23 We conclude that
our calibration strategy imposes sucient discipline on the distribution of a
so that the normality assumption used in the baseline is not critical per se in
determining the elasticity of educational attainment to relative earnings.
6 Conclusion
We developed a model of schooling decisions to address the role of changes in
the returns to education on the rise of educational attainment in the United
States between 1940 and 2000. The model features discrete schooling choices
and individual heterogeneity so that people sort themselves into the dierent
schooling groups. In the model, skill-biased technical change increases the re-
turns to schooling thereby creating an incentive for more people to attain higher
levels of schooling. We nd that changes in the returns to education generate
a substantial increase in educational attainment and that this quantitative im-
portance is robust to relevant variations in the model. We also found that the
substantial changes in life expectancy in the data turn out to explain almost
none of the change in educational attainment in the model.
There are several issues that would be worth exploring further. First, we
have only slightly touched on the factors that can contribute to the slowdown in
educational attainment since the late 70s. Assessing the contribution of rising
college costs together with tighter borrowing constraints is important in ad-
dressing educational policy questions. Second, it would be interesting to assess
the role of changes in the returns to education on educational attainment in
other contexts such as across genders, races, and countries. For instance, it
would be relevant to investigate changes in the returns to schooling in coun-
tries with dierent labor-market institutions. Institutions that compress wages
may reduce the incentives for schooling investment and perhaps, holding other
institutional aspects constant, this wage compression may explain the lower edu-
cational attainment in some European countries compared to the United States.
Similarly, it is relevant to explore the changes in the returns to education for
women in conjunction with the observed increase in labor market participation
and the reduction in the gender wage gap. A quick look at the data suggests
that changes in the returns to schooling for women have been similar than that
of men. Hence, together with faster overall wage growth and an increase in
labor market hours for women may explain the larger increase in educational
23We also compare the density functions obtained for the marginal utility of schooling in the
baseline (Normal) model and the current (Beta) model. We do that by constructing a vector
of 1;000 equally spaced points within 5 standard deviations from the mean. At each point
we calculate the density function for each model and compute the norm of the dierence. We
nd dierences of the order of 1:0e 5.
24attainment observed for women between 1940 and 2000. Third, our analysis
has taken the direction of technical change as given. It would be interesting
to study quantitatively the process of human capital accumulation allowing for
endogenous technical change in the spirit of Galor and Moav (2000). We leave
all these relevant explorations for future research.
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27Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Interpretation
Parameters Parmeters
2000 Calibration 1940 Calibration
Length of schooling
s1 gs1 = 1:0017
s2 gs2 = 1:0007
s3 gs3 = 1:0
Length of life T = 67
Interest rate r = 1:04
Subjective discount factor  = 1=r
Human capital technology  = 0:94, q = 0:46  = 0:94, q = 0:95
Distribution of a  = 0:94,  = 0:48  = 0:49,  = 0:34
Growth rates
Neutral technology g = 1:0150 g = 1:0133
HS biased technology gz2 = 1:0033 gz2 = 1:0033
College biased technology gz3 = 1:0049 gz3 = 1:0049
Table 2: Decomposing the Role of Skill-Biased Technology and TFP
Baseline Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
Years of Schooling
2000 13.30 12.34 12.82 12.07 12.71
1940 9.74 12.14 10.11 12.07 10.69
Ratio 1.37 1.02 1.27 1.00 1.19
Ratio of Relative
Earnings 2000/1940
College/HS 1.07 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.03
HS/Less HS 1.16 1.00 1.16 1.00 1.08
Average Growth (%)
GDP per Worker 2.00 1.67 2.00 1.59 1.86
Note { Exp. 1: No high-school bias; Exp. 2: No college bias; Exp. 3: No skill biased technical
change bias; Exp 4: Half the skill biases.
The gure 1:07 means that the ratio of earnings between college and high school is 7 percent
higher in 2000 than in 1940.
28Table 3: Ratio of Earnings Age 55 to Age 25
Less than
high-school high-school College
25 in 1940 3.19 3.39 3.86
(= 3:19  1:06) (= 3:39  1:13)
25 in 1970 1.14 1.48 2.25
(= 1:14  1:30) (= 1:48  1:52)
Note { The gures are the ratio of real annual earnings of a person at age 55 versus age 25,
by educational groups and generations.
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis { Elasticity of Substitution across Education
Groups ()
1940 2000
p2;1940 p3;1940    z2 z3 z2 z3
 = 0:8 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.54 0.89 0.87 0.69 1.07 1.06
 = 0:6 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.54 0.89 0.91 0.72 1.19 1.25
 = 0:4 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.54 0.89 0.99 0.77 1.47 1.73
29Figure 1: The Evolution of Educational Attainment
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A { White men B { Black men












L e s s   t h a n   h i g h   s c h o o l
C o l l e g e











































C o l l e g e
H i g h   s h o o l   o r   s o m e   c o l l e g e


































C { White women D { Black women
Note { See the appendix for the source of data.





Figure 3: Distribution of Educational Attainment
a21 a32




31Figure 4: Relative Annual Earnings { Model vs. Data
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Note { The model data are represented with solid lines. The U.S. data are represented by
dotted lines.
Figure 5: Educational Attainment { Model vs. Data
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Note { The model data are represented with solid lines. The U.S. data are represented by
dotted lines.
32Figure 6: Educational Attainment { Model with Fixed Costs vs. Data
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Note { The model data are represented with solid lines. The U.S. data are represented by
dotted lines.
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